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NATO’s demise has been much heralded, dismissed by many as a remnant of the Cold War era, 
with no role in today’s complex security environment. Institutionally, the Alliance has endured beyond 
expected norms, evolving to remain relevant. This paper examines thematically how the Alliance has 
developed, through the prisms of its institutions, capabilities and political will. Analysing the areas of 
international relations and institutional theory, it establishes that NATO remains relevant. Whilst the 
Alliance is more flexible than it is perceived, enlargement has brought a divergence of views amongst 
members, which has led to particular tensions in burden-sharing and willingness to face risk, as 
highlighted in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Whilst this dissonance continues, there is little prospect of 
NATO challenging the UN in terms of legitimate intervention. The process of change must continue.  
 





This paper will consider whether a watershed moment has been reached for the Alliance 
making it necessary to consider significant reform or to accept the consequences of 
continued inaction. Arising as it did to counteract the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the 
aftermath of World War II, it was perhaps not unreasonable for many to predict that NATO, 
following the demise of the threat, would at the very least lose its relevance; after all, from a 
realist perspective ‘alliances should not outlive the threats they were created to address.’ 
(Wallander, 2000:705). 
As the Alliance starts to look at its existence beyond the Afghanistan, it does so at a time 
when the US has announced its intention to turn its attention to the Pacific region, coinciding 
with a wave of stringent defence cuts, and in the shadow of the institutional shock brought 
about by the disagreement over Iraq in 2003 (Telegraph Online, 2003). 
The Libyan campaign has served as a further catalyst to prompt introspection, albeit that 
those commentators were divided as to whether the operation would signal the end of the 
Alliance or provide a much needed fillip to reassure it of its continued relevance. Regardless 
of whether the operation was successful in the short term, the one certainty is that the 
endeavour brought to the surface the tensions that exist between member states such as the 
United Kingdom and France, who are willing to take the lead in military intervention in such 
instances, and others like Germany who is reticent to do so (Erlanger and Dempsy, 2011). 
Such a situation potentially undermines, quite fundamentally, the concept of solidarity upon 
which the Alliance was formed and which has continued to attract new members. 
This paper will examine the relationship between purpose and threat, i.e. why the 
Alliance exists and what challenges threaten it. Whilst there are four research questions, the 
main body will be divided into three areas in order to address the issues they raise; I have 
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chosen this approach on the basis that the historical context of the Alliance is a central theme 
throughout and it would be unhelpful to produce a separate section dealing with this issue. It 
is also the case that there is significant overlap between the core issues, each therefore lends 
something to answering the questions. I will look at the historical threat, seeking to explain 
what NATO is and what resistance there is to change. Consideration will be given to what 
has changed in the three areas, and how they relate to the current environment, by addressing 
the issues through historical contextualisation and consideration of relevant theory. 
The specific research questions to be considered will be: 
 
1. Is NATO fit for purpose in view of the current range of threats and the likely nature of 
future conflict?  
2. In order to ensure prompt action is taken to address future threats, should the 
organisation review its voting method and its reliance on consensus? 
3. Do recent operations represent the shape of future interventions or is such templating 
unhelpful? 
4. Could NATO become the effective enforcement arm of the UN Security Council – 
would it ever be tempted again to act unilaterally? 
  
As a result of this analysis a number of findings will be established. Firstly, despite 
repeated criticism, NATO is essentially a robust organisation that has continually evolved in 
order to remain relevant; this process has been assisted by the Alliance’s inherent flexibility 
arising out of the ambiguity (Foster and Wallace, 2001:108) of its establishing treaty. 
Secondly, the process of continued enlargement will inevitably increase the amount of 
bureaucracy surrounding the workings of the alliance, which in turn must increase the 
likelihood of dissenting views. As well as an ability to suspend member states, the adoption 
of a voting system based upon the principle of variable geometry appears unnecessary. 
Arising from the above competing perspectives is a new conceptualisation of burden-sharing. 
NATO is providing an alternative path for international legitimacy, however, irrespective of 
a desire to act pragmatically, a failure to address the issue of burden-sharing coupled with the 
dissonance between member states, will reduce what NATO may achieve and make any 





The 4th April 1949 saw the signing of the Washington Treaty and the establishment of 
the North Atlantic Alliance, which according to the preamble was designed to ‘…safeguard 
the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They are resolved to unite their efforts for 
collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security’. The purpose of the 
organisation was more succinctly captured by Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of 
NATO, who said ‘the aim was to keep the Soviets out, the Germans down and the Americans 
in’ (De Wijk, 1997:6). 
NATO has demonstrated remarkable longevity for an Alliance, and has seen a gradual 
transformation of purpose during the course of its existence with an increasing emphasis on 
the political as opposed to the purely military dimension. Unsurprisingly its tenure has seen it 





potential for weak states to undermine the strong, a potential for corruption, that it 
undermines national sovereignty, shows a lack of responsiveness in crises and that the global 
governance it perpetuates is that of an elite. The contemporary challenges it faces are to 
adapt its existing rules and processes to allow it to remain relevant, the continuing rise of 
non-state actors, the dynamics and complexity of globalisation and the potential conflicts of 
interests between its member states. It is clear from the varying ways in which countries have 
joined NATO that a host of political concerns as well as a changing direction for the 
organization have heavily influenced its adaptation. 
Whilst the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by twelve countries in 1949, only the first 
seven of these had been involved in the drafting of the Treaty. Whilst Germany and Spain 
fell within the geographical criteria for membership, neither was offered such due to 
Germany being occupied and Spain being viewed as having an undemocratic regime. While 
NATO policy towards membership is stated to be ‘open door’ there are requirements that 
need to be met beyond an intention to further the Washington treaty. The need for democracy 
as well as economic constraints can represent the biggest hurdles to accession in so far as 
they require foundational changes to the sovereign states. These limitations have led to the 
slow expansion of NATO since its inception. 
As a result of their strategic importance both Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1950 
in line with the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union. Difficulties arose however over 
the issue of consensus, as this move caused concern among some member states who 
“opposed the plan on the grounds that admitting Greece and particularly Turkey...would 
change NATO from a closely knit community to a widespread anti-Soviet alliance and 
seriously weaken it” (Smith, 2000:77). The lack of agreement saw only associate status 
awarded to Greece and Turkey, a position that endured until 1952 when they were welcomed 
as full members. This episode highlights early concerns as to what direction the Alliance was 
moving in. With the heightened tensions of the Cold War, it was important that NATO was 
able to find a solution to prevent Soviet influence from ensnaring Greece and Turkey.  
With NATO being formed so soon after the defeat of Nazi Germany, German 
membership of NATO would always have been a contested concept. Whilst there were clear 
security arguments to support German membership, a host of issues, led to prolonged 
political deliberations to ensure consensus was achieved; the Federal Republic of Germany 
became a member of NATO in 1955. 
NATO’s expansion eastward began in the 90s with the accession of Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech Republic in March 1999. A key question for the future relevance of the 
organization now arises in how far east the organization should continue to expand. As will 
be discussed later, the stretching of the geographic boundaries of NATO has far-flung 
impacts on the organization. It is forced to allow for a greater range of ideologies and 
agendas that will address the crises at hand. At this time, NATO’s involvement in South-
eastern Europe - Yugoslavia, Kosovo – demonstrate a core regional importance for the 
organization, and its role as a regional peacekeeper exists not only in its capacity for military 
projection but through its open-doors policy to membership. The addition to the Alliance five 
years later of seven countries from Central and Eastern Europe saw its membership rise to 
twenty-six. Its most recent additions were Albania and Croatia.  
From a theoretical perspective the formation, and continued expansion, of the Alliance 
aligns itself with one of two distinct hypotheses which describe the manner in which states 
respond when confronted by an external threat, namely balancing and bandwagoning. The 
first of these describes the situation when threatened states join together to confront the 
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threat, therefore seeking strength in numbers, whilst the latter represents a choice by the 
threatened state to join with the threatening party, thereby gaining strength by association. In 
terms of patterns of state behaviour, Britain’s policy was described by Winston Churchill 
thus, ‘For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, 
most aggressive, most dominating power on the Continent… It would have been easy …and 
tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of the conquest. However, we always 
took the harder course, joined with the less strong powers, …and thus defeated the 
Continental military tyrant whoever he was’ (Kaplan, 2004). Whilst it was therefore a 
characteristic choice for Britain, it is worth noting that the previous stance of the United 
States in such matters had been affirmed by George Washington as ‘It is our true policy to 
steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world’.  This exemplifies 
how an alliance such as NATO will ultimately consist of states with a range of motivations 
and beliefs regarding their membership.  
When considering the continuing utility of NATO to the US, one hypothesis might be 
that almost too quickly for there to have been any outspoken desire for change, one 
existential threat (USSR) was replaced by what was perceived to be another (Global War on 
Terror), both of them being conceptually too great a threat for the US to contend with by 
themselves. The alternate view would be that the Alliance provided a convenient mechanism 
through which the hegemonic power (US) could exercise their control whilst ostensibly 
maintaining the demeanour of a beneficent liberal power. One other potential explanation for 
why there was little pressure either for structural change or less involvement by the US is 
that there was a generational comfort in being part of the organisation. This point was 
considered by Rajan Menon, who noted ‘Because the Cold War lasted for nearly half a 
century, most Americans cannot remember a time when the Atlantic alliance was not an 
essential item in our strategic toolkit or a staple of our foreign policy lexicon’ (Menon, 
2007:90).  
It was the flexibility of the consensus rule that allowed the Alliance to cope with a 
number of what may have become crises had a method not been found by which the Alliance 
could make a decision. When France, as a response to the Suez crisis, decided in 1966 to 
withdraw from the NATO Integrated Military Structure (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009:212), the 
decision not only damaged NATO defence capacity in the short-term (Kaplan, 2004:33) but 
could have threatened NATO's institutional cohesiveness had a pragmatic solution not been 
found. The subsequent adoption of the newly created Defence Planning Committee allowed 
the remainder of NATO to continue to deal with defence issues as and when they arose.  
There are a number of peculiarities immediately apparent about NATO when compared 
to other similar International Organisations. Its founding treaty, comprising of fourteen 
relatively simple articles is unusually brief. Key within this is the consensus rule itself. 
Interestingly the word consensus is not mentioned once within the fourteen articles; Article 
10 comes closest with its requirement that ‘unanimous agreement’ is required before a new 
country may be invited to join the Alliance. In the absence of any prescribed voting 
requirements if no country positively objects to a decision or statement there is deemed to be 
consensus. Should any country disagree, the proposed decision/statement will require re-
drafting in an attempt to secure agreement. One other related custom that has developed in 
parallel is that the name of the objecting country is not usually made public. This could 
arguably be described as undemocratic, in the sense that the representatives cannot be held 
publicly accountable for their position on any given matter; this is in stark contrast to the 





resolutions from passing have their decision to do so scrutinised by the world media (Prince, 
2012). 
Conversely it could be argued that the absence of a requirement for a country to 
positively affirm a decision, allows member states to acquiesce to a decision, whilst perhaps 
not having definitively been in agreement with it. In so doing the operation of the rule allows 
states to protect their sovereignty to some extent; the dangers arising from this being that the 
nuance of some members’ actions will often not be recognised, as NATO is seen as 
responding as a collective. 
The issue of collective defence, benefits from what may be seen as intelligent drafting, in 
that the following provisions place no specific demands as to what type of assistance is to be 
provided to member states invoking its protection: 
In addition, as a result of such brevity little is said about institutional structures, mention 
only being made of a Council and a Defence Committee. The first of these could be 
considered to be the political element at which each member state is represented and where 
the goal of NATO is decided. The second, represents the military capacity of the 
organization. With the need for a military structure and the ability to rapidly deploy assets as 
core to the organization, the Defence Committee acts to meet the needs of the council. A 
requirement of the treaty is that it is constituted in such a way as to be able to convene 
“promptly at any time”. This onerous requirement led to the appointment of permanent 
representatives; when matters of fundamental importance are discussed often at summits 
where the heads of each member state will appear in person, the Council has overarching 
responsibility and authority. 
The Defence Committee, being the other named body, was actually subsumed into the 
Council in 1951. Thereafter the Council, under the stewardship of the Secretary General, has 
used its general power under Article 9 to create committees as and when required. 
Institutionally, the flexibility provided by the treaty, has allowed for an evolution in structure 
with the capacity to match the evolving mission and purpose of the overall Alliance. 
Whilst some contend that NATO is there already, and others argue that the moment is yet 
to come, consideration ought to be given to what a multi-speed or multi-tier system would 
mean for NATO; does it represent institutional salvation and therefore indicate the way 
forward, or does the fragmented nature of a multi-tier system mean that essentially the seeds 
of demise are already present and that the subsequent failure of NATO is inevitable; or 
should it simply be accepted as the next chapter in the changing nature of an ever more 
complex alliance, and that actually the challenge is about how the new systems are made to 
work? 
In order to consider the efficacy of any such proposal it is necessary to analyse some of 
the more realistic alternatives that have been proposed and whether they would ever be 
politically acceptable. 
Leo G. Michel has explored a number of realistic alternatives to the application of the 
consensus rule; he identifies four alternative rules, namely, the ‘Threatened Ally’, 
‘SACEUR’s Discretion’, ‘Empowering “Coalitions within NATO” and the ‘Consensus 
Minus’ rule (Michel, 2003:1-8). In short, underpinning the conclusions arrived at in this 
paper, he accepts that whilst a number of alternatives could be tried, each would come with a 
cost, one notable one he highlights is that qualified majority voting could produce a system 
where the US could be outvoted; there was also no guarantee that an amended voting system 
would produce a better outcome than the current practice. Constructive ambiguity in this 
respect may well be the least bad option available. 
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A number of problems exist with this line of thought both practically and conceptually. It 
is worth noting the irony that the situation produces, namely that in order to amend the 
consensus rule consensus would have to first be obtained; logic would dictate that it is highly 
unlikely to occur. It is more likely that due to the spread of differing perspectives and views, 
further friction will arise to the level and extent beyond which it could be considered to be 
useful to the Alliance. 
It should also be appreciated that any amended system must be able to cater for the full 
range of decisions made by NATO, which go far beyond the area of military intervention. 
Institutionally it would seem that despite having undergone numerous crises almost from the 
outset, the freedom the Alliance’s founding treaty provided, has been exploited to allow the 
continued resilience for which it is now known. However, its growth in both membership 






Changes to its military strategy have been central to NATO’s ability to remain relevant 
and effective. While other international organizations such as the UN and the EU have relied 
on diplomatic pressures to resolve issues where possible, it is usually the case that when 
military power becomes desirable, responsibility falls to NATO to intervene. While at its 
inception, the projection power of the organisation would deter grand conflicts such as those 
that took place at the start of the 20th century, the drawn out political conflict of the Cold War 
would see NATO questioning how it can deter an overwhelming global nuclear presence. 
Ultimately it is the organizational structure and combined military capacity of member states 
that defines NATO’s military presence. While an ever ready taskforce remains central to 
NATO’s effectiveness in rapid deployment it is the combined military potential of all 
member states which give it such military authority in the event of drawn out crises. Its 
military actions will also be bolstered by strong international diplomatic pressures, such as 
trade sanctions, through its relationship with the UN giving it a rounded approach that is 
difficult for any third party to oppose. While NATO retains autonomy, the political 
motivations behind its actions are made clear through its condemnations and diplomatic 
efforts which coincide with military interventions, efforts for clarity when they do not 
compromise security are a core part of the establishment of both organizations’ authority. In 
fact, it is only within the framework of the UN Charter that NATO military presence can be 
legally justified. The fundamental defence purpose of NATO is set out in Article 5 of the 
Treaty and refers directly to Article 51 of the UN Charter describing the termination of 
interventions undertaken by NATO countries when the UN Security Council has ‘taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.’ With 
legitimacy established through relations with the UN and NATO’s projection power 
unrivalled as a result of international cooperation the core military strategy can be said to be 
to deny any opportunity for third party opposition. An issue that arises as a result of a 
combined overwhelming presence is where the military capabilities should come from when 
the entire recourses of the organization are not required. 
The debate over burden sharing is intimately intertwined with the essential purpose 
behind the Alliance’s existence, and has continued through the Cold War to persist in recent 





Burden-sharing is the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of 
accomplishing a common goal (Foster and Cimbala, 2005:1). 
 
Whilst many of the challenges faced by NATO as it looks to move forward are new or 
novel, burden-sharing is both enduring and emotive, deriving as it does from the perception 
of inequities that inevitably arise from any group dynamic where (in simple terms) some 
form of sharing or distribution is required. The area is one which highlights the predominant 
fault line upon which the transatlantic nature of the Alliance rests, attracting ire and derision 
of both politicians and electorates on either side of the Atlantic.  It is a fault line which 
becomes exacerbated whenever financial pressures are faced by individual member states (a 
pressure which is often experienced in close proximity with each other), who will find it 
more politically acceptable to reduce defence spending than spending in other areas, and 
whenever the Alliance is faced with providing a deployable military force. The resultant 
impact of either situation has continually been the (correct) impression that certain elements 
of the Alliance are contributing more than others, in terms of pure financial contribution as 
well as the correct instruments and spirit to conduct operations. Such perceptions lead to the 
(mainly) unspoken accusations that members of the Alliance, absent a credible commitment 
to either category discussed above, are seeking to obtain a ‘free ride’. The natural 
consequence of this is for fissures to deepen and senses of ill-feeling to rise, which often then 
impact upon other aspects of Alliance cohesion, for example where those member states who 
are not viewed to be ‘pulling their weight’ are deemed to have less right to have a say in 
other areas (Clark, 2001:447). Should this include the strategy for future direction and 
intervention then the situation could to some degree become self-perpetuating. 
It would be easy for the casual observer to conclude that the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Libya, provide evidence that the issue of burden-sharing is yet another instance of an 
artificial crisis. However, as will be seen this issue is perhaps closer to a true crisis than any 
other.  
As with enlargement, burden-sharing can be seen as a distinctly different concept during 
and after the Cold War. One fundamental issue which is both central and problematic is how 
the contribution of respective member states is measured. Whilst many would say that their 
contribution to the Alliance could be termed as on a somewhat ethereal plane, this is virtually 
impossible to quantify for critical legislatures, who will instead seek to rely on military 
expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product as a more demonstrable metric 
(Hartley and Sandler, 1999:665-680). 
The statement of requirement for states’ contribution arises out of Article 3 of the 
Washington Treaty, which requires members to ‘maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack’. For once the constructive ambiguity of the 
original text may well be considered to be a hindrance, as in the absence of specified 
contributions, member states embarked historically on the process of burden-shifting, namely 
‘the art of manipulating alliance relationships for political gains’ (Thies, 2003:8). 
The ill-feeling that this predicament has, and continues to cause, was perhaps best 
enunciated by President Eisenhower, whose view of the behaviour of his European allies in 
the 1950s was ‘I get weary of the European habit of taking our money, resenting any slight 
hint as to what they should do, and then assuming, in addition, full right to criticize us as 
bitterly as they may desire.  
It is worth considering that the concept of ‘free riding, it arises from a theoretical analysis 
of international burden-sharing; the most notable study in this field is that of Mancur Olson 
 KWANG HO CHUN  74 
 
and Richard Zeckhauser in an article published in 1966 entitled ‘An Economic Theory of 
Alliances’ (Olsen and Zeckhauser, 1966). This article draws an analogy between the 
provision of collective security by an international organisation with the requirement within 
sovereign states to provide safety and security for its citizens; by adopting the phraseology 
one would expect to see in a state, the authors then propose a ‘public goods’ theory in 
relation to burden-sharing. Member States make contributions towards this public good, but 
in a system absent of centralised authority, the model will see the larger states bearing a 
disproportionate amount of the burden. 
Whilst the study is now almost fifty years old, the analysis contained within it has a 
remarkable resonance with the characteristics of NATO (Ringsmose, 2010:329); it also 
discerns a quite fundamental distinction between the ideologies of small and large states, 
when it notes that these countries’ respective views on their role in the world may be 
influenced by the fact that ‘…small nations, who find that even large sacrifices on their part 
have little effect on the global balance, would often be attracted to neutral or passive foreign 
policies, and that large nations, who know that their efforts can decisively influence world 
events in their own interest, will continually need to emphasise the urgency of the struggle in 
which they are engaged’ (Olsen and Zeckhauser, 1966:17-18). As a theoretical foundation 
this could be said to provide a model to explain the current array of divergent of views 
regarding the shape and future of NATO.  
The issue of burden-sharing was not an issue that arose immediately upon the creation of 
NATO (Chalmers, 2000:21). This may in part provide an explanation as to why the wording 
of Article 3 was allowed to be quite as lax as it is. This situation changed in 1950 with the 
invasion of South Korea by North Korea, which led in turn to increased defence spending on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and a significant structural upheaval within NATO as it sought to 
transform from an ideological alliance to a functioning military coalition. 
The following forty-year period saw the continuation of what was effectively a one-
dimensional argument, namely that the pendulum of the transatlantic bargain (Sloan, 
2005:13-27) had swung too far to the detriment of the United States. That the matter was 
never brought to a head undoubtedly had much to do with the fact that whilst the US spent 
more on defence than its alliance partners, it benefited strategically from the role and 
influence it enjoyed (Chalmers, 2001:573-574) and therefore the ‘tensions were contained 
within the transatlantic community’ (Hallams and Schreer, 2012:315). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the ramifications of the ending of the Soviet threat lead to an 
expectation among member states that there would be a widespread reduction in defence 
spending; this is empirically supported by the fact that between 1989 and 2000 the US 
reduced its defence spending (as a percentage of GDP) from 6.0% to 3.0%. By comparison 
the reduction, taken as an average, for the five largest European states (France, UK, Italy, 
Germany and Spain), over the same period was 3.1% to 2.0% (Chalmers, 2001:574). Whilst 
on the face of it, the burden-sharing gap of defence spending has narrowed, the ability to 
contribute in terms of military capability has widened. The debate has also broadened to the 
extent that the concept of burden-sharing is now deemed to include the burden of risk, both 
physical and political. 
NATO’s Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, identifies the inequitable trend in 
defence spending as an area of urgent concern, noting that by the end of the Cold War the 
European contribution to NATO amounted to 34% of the total, but that this has since fallen 
to 21% with the United States and Canada paying the remainder (Rasmussen, 2011:2-6). 





audience with an election looming, have effectively condoned the à la carte approach which 
normally antagonises them so much. 
A previous Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, when considering the 
complexities of burden-sharing and how it might be fairly measured, came to a rather 
pragmatic conclusion, namely, ‘The sense of keeping one’s obligations and commitments to 
other allies upon whom one’s own security ultimately depends, is a powerful driver towards 
equitable burden-sharing. Totally fair burden-sharing may not be possible, but an organised 
security organisation like NATO undoubtedly allows us to come closer to it than could any 
other approach’ (Michaels, 2011). 
The painful truth pertaining to the above situation is that for perhaps the first time 
directly, the US has adopted this approach to involvement in a NATO mission. After years of 
public and private condemnations of their Allies for failures to contribute as required, as 
opposed to how it best suited, the actions of the US over Libya, designed doubtless to 
appease a domestic audience with an election looming, has effectively condoned the very 
same à la carte approach which normally antagonises them so much. 
Due to the internal politicking and lack of consensus about the nature of NATO 
involvement in security crises, member states could now be said to fall into four categories 
when NATO goes to war: ‘those which have the right troops, weapons and view the given 
mission as central to their security; those with the right means but which take part out of 
solidarity; those which have real military forces but choose not to take part because they 
disagree with the mission; and those which simply do not have many meaningful forces to 
contribute’ (Valasek, 2011:4). This has been vividly illustrated by the campaigns in both 
Afghanistan and Libya; the latter campaign was particularly notable from a capability 
perspective ‘only 14 out of 28 members contributed military assets and only six European 
nations (Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Norway and Denmark) contributed to the strike 
mission’ (Hallams and Schreer, 2012:322). With national contributions at this level, 
prolonged and concerted military campaigns would be hard to sustain.  Particularly so, when 
one notes that a number of those who did contribute were already committed in Afghanistan; 
there would appear to be little sharing of the burden in view.  
 
 
4. POLITICAL WILL 
 
From an institutionalist perspective, any given institution should only continue to exist if 
it remains relevant to its members and they continue to derive a quantifiable benefit from 
membership. The willingness to adapt flows from the political will to do so; therefore once 
the existential threat against which NATO as a collective security organisation was designed 
to respond had ceased to exist, there must have been the desire for the organisation to 
continue which led to the successful and persistent adaptations that followed.  
NATO’s strategic response to a changed and ever-changing environment has been 
marked by their development of new roles and missions, and through the process of 
enlargement, coupled with and through the Partnership for Peace process. The Alliance has 
had to look to counter both traditional and emerging threats, accepting that their role has now 
become unfettered by their original geographical limitations. The backdrop to this has seen a 
revolution in military affairs and the continued heightened level of inflation in the defence 
sector, juxtaposed with a political expectation of a peace dividend and widespread reductions 
in defence spending. The maintenance of a cohesive political will and spirit in these 
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circumstances would be difficult enough in any individual state, it should therefore come as 
no surprise that what has been described as ‘…that most tenuous of all assets, solidarity’ 
(Volker, 2011) has been rather elusive in an alliance of twenty-eight countries. 
An inability to achieve consensus over strategic goals, rather like burden-sharing, is not a 
new challenge for the Alliance, which has seen numerous disagreements throughout the Cold 
War years, arising largely from the US nuclear position and dominance of the organisation; 
this latter issue contributing to France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military 
command structure (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009:212). 
The Harmel Report sought, in 1967, to ascertain ‘The Future tasks of the Alliance’. 
Regarding the central purposes of the alliance, it declares that they were ‘to assure the 
balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.’ This 
essentially sums up the Alliance’s collective defence posture, which provides for the second 
role ‘to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the 
underlying political issues can be solved.’ The report also looked to the Alliance’s potential 
future role stating that ‘The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and 
lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees’ (NATO 
The Harmel Report). 
‘By early 1990 the Alliance had no choice but to fundamentally reconsider its future. In 
the first instance two crucial questions dominated: what is the Alliance’s future mission and 
what form must the transatlantic relation take?’ History now tells us that NATO, had already 
begun to consider how their strategy might need to develop in the event of a changed 
security situation. A paper entitled 'Alliance Security beyond CFE, colloquially known as the 
‘Wittmann’ paper, predicted a more political role for NATO in the future, a future in which 
the threat would be more unpredictable and "the emphasis would shift to smaller non-
traditionalist threats” (De Wijk, 1997:9-14). Whilst somewhat ahead of its time, the report 
can be seen to have provided the momentum for the fundamental review of strategy that was 
to occur in London in 1990.  
NATO’s reinvention began with a new strategic concept in 1991  that, with a subtlety 
borne of a desire not to excite either internal or external actors, signalled a gradual shift in 
Alliance’s direction, acknowledging that ‘The diversity of challenges now facing the 
Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security’. It also accepted that in seeking to 
promote the peace and security it would need when looking to resolve crises ‘a coherent 
approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and co-ordinating 
appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other 
measures’ (NATO cps). Whilst indicating that a different military posture was now also 
appropriate, many of the fundamental principles of NATO remained the same, not least of 
which was the fact that it was still a collective defence organisation. 
Somewhat conveniently, NATO was able to demonstrate its utility and relevance through 
operations in Bosnia (1995-6) and Kosovo (1999). From a strategic perspective it has though 
been said that ‘The Alliance’s multiple tasks created the kind of strategic ambiguity that 
prevented a consensus on thoroughgoing military reform’ (Farrell and Rynning, 2010:673). 
The obvious issue was that the European members of NATO were deemed as being reliant 
on the US to assist in the stabilisation of the security situation in Europe. Conversely, whilst 
the US had previously enjoyed a dominant position within NATO it now found itself, 
particularly in Kosovo, shackled in its actions through a process now colloquially referred to 
as ‘war by committee’.  





enlargement, was well described by President Vaclav Havel in 1995. The then President of 
the Czech Republic, speaking at SHAPE Headquarters, thought that NATO needed firstly to 
establish what it was, and what it intended to do, before looking at enlarging, ‘The expansion 
of NATO should be preceded by something even more important, that is a new formulation 
of its own meaning, mission and identity’ (OMRI Daily Digest, 1995). Whether the ever-
changing global context or the political flux within the Alliance will ever allow this is 
questionable.  
In light of its success in the Balkans, its strategic concept in 1999 would highlight the 
organization’s continued relevance; it would outline unpredictable changes in the regions 
security climate, stating the need for adaptability as conventional warfare in the region 
becomes less of a threat. The core part of its message in 1999 is in its calling for greater 
regional integration, this is key to the continued expansionism of NATO as its role as a 
regional stabilizer is not restricted to its military capability. In its 2010 strategic concept, 
NATO outlined the increasing threat of long distance attacks, of weapons of mass 
destruction including nuclear proliferation and of international terrorism as well as cyber-
attacks all of which cannot be addressed by a conventional military force. Despite stating a 
continued need for the expansion of military assets, the 2010 concept outlines a need for 
international cooperation including partnerships with nations outside of NATO to address the 
new concerns. 
Undoubtedly the belief underpinning the original Atlantic bargain was that if a European 
Alliance member was ever subjected to an armed attack, it was the US who would be relied 
upon to remedy the situation. In that sense the attacks of 9/11 could not have been forecast; 
neither perhaps could the fact that when the Alliance strove to exercise its Article 5 
responsibility for the first time, the offer of support would be spurned. It could be said from 
an Alliance perspective that the attacks spawned a range of mixed emotions; a sense of fear 
that the refusal of the collective defence offer had proved the myriad critics correct, by 
showing that the Alliance when called upon was a paper tiger.  
Rajan Menon is pessimistic in this regard, in part due to the markedly differing 
demographics spanning the Atlantic, the effect of which he sees as ‘...if NATO joins or aids 
American military operations in the Islamic world, Europe’s own Muslim population could 
be radicalised, creating the spectre of homegrown terrorism, which will prove even harder to 
suppress than its foreign counterpart’ (Menon, 2007:75-83). 
Whilst the issues of burden-sharing are symptomatic of the underlying dissonance 
between what member states want from NATO membership and what they are willing to 
give, they are arguably merely a manifestation of the essential structural weakness which 
flows from political will. Whilst enlargement has brought with it many positive aspects, 
undoubtedly one area it has weakened is that of cohesiveness. 
In Rajan Menon’s view ‘Political constraints will limit European NATO’s inclination to 
wage war and keep peace far from home’ (Menon, 2007: 90) and that any talk or strategy of 
a more expansionist role is subject to the following consideration ‘The question for the future 
is this: will NATO’s European members agree to re-engineer NATO from an alliance 
conceived to defend Europe into one that assumes self-anointed responsibilities of military 
intervention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking beyond the Continent, even as the rest of the 
world registers its disapproval of an American-led Western posse?’ It could be suggested that 
the philosophical question has been overtaken by events (Schwarz, 2010: 339-362). 
Regarding interventions without a UN mandate, clearly the precedent has to some degree 
been set, and there has on occasion been speculation that the UN has become marginalised in 
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relation both to NATO and the US, particularly when concerned with humanitarian 
intervention. In view of the continued reluctance of both China and Russia to allow the 
Security Council to authorise the use of force on this premise (RUSI, 2011) there is an 
enhanced probability that situations may occur again when, with proceedings before the 
Security Council stalled, a coalition of the willing under a NATO command structure may 
decide to act. 
Whilst this paper does not aim to compare NATO with the UN, a legitimate comparison 
can be made, and even a cursory appreciation of the respective institutional structures reveals 
a number of common weaknesses, identified by the arch-realist academic Colin Gray in the 
following terms: 
  
…such inventions as the United Nations and NATO were created on the basis of political 
assumptions that are almost wholly irrelevant today and in the near-term future, at least. Both 
organisations perform some useful functions, although it is debatable whether or not their potential 
for harm renders them a net liability for international strategic security. The problem is that the 
political context has changed, but those organizations have not, indeed, in most respects, cannot 
(Gray, 2006:73). 
 
The imperative, militarily, looking towards future threats and interventions is for the 
Alliance to be able to act decisively and promptly, and be able to demonstrate both their 





Despite repeated protestations to the contrary, NATO institutionally remains alive; 
perhaps more so than many give it credit for, but certainly not to the extent imagined by its 
greatest, somewhat subjective, supporters; it would however seem unlikely to disappear for 
purely practical reasons: 
 
An explanation for NATO’s continued existence after the end of the Cold War is that the Alliance 
has evolved from a traditional alliance for collective defence into a political-military organisation 
for security co-operation, supported by an extensive and complex bureaucracy. Extensive 
bureaucracies do not generally disappear, instead they undergo a functional transformation when 
forced to by circumstances (De Wijk, 1997:150).  
 
Historically, it could be said that even when a clear, singular, existential threat existed, 
NATO had flaws; undeniably, as the singular threat faded, to be replaced by a more complex 
array of challenges, the opacity of its mission brought the flaws into clearer relief. Whilst 
there is a temptation to praise the institution for its resilience and adaptability, it must be 
accepted that in merely surviving there is an inherent issue. 
 
An ability to adapt in the face of changing circumstances can thus indicate a diminished potential 
for effectiveness, which in turn could affect the long-term sustainability of the organisation. In 
other words, survival and longevity are not necessarily indicative of success in fulfilling mandates. 





To ascertain an answer to the question of whether NATO is fit for purpose, requires an 
understanding first of what is it that NATO exists to achieve; this is not necessarily based 
upon the premise that one clear vision is necessary institutionally in order to continue to 
function, however without such a vision it is harder to establish a metric by which success or 
failure could be judged. In terms of institutional expectations, whilst the collective element 
of NATO’s raison d’être has maintained, the belief is created that there will be a unifying 
narrative stating a core belief and purpose. 
Continued enlargement can be seen in many respects as a purely political endeavour 
which has weakened the essential structure of NATO, upon which it relies for the purposes 
of projecting credible military force. Mention has been made of the theory of balancing upon 
which threatened states are drawn to seek NATO membership. NATO’s structural imbalance 
is in part caused by the fact that the accession criteria are based on the possession of liberal 
democratic values and ideology, rather than the possession of military capability, wealth, or 
even, a desire and willingness to fight if required. Realistically though, whilst future 
enlargement can be subjected to further debate, that which has taken place ought not to be. 
An alternative perspective by which to consider whether NATO is fit for purpose is to 
consider whether there is a credible alternative to replace it. Institutional redundancy could 
arise as a result of irrelevance due to the absence of a clear threat or mission, or by being 
replaced by another better suited more capable organisation. History tells us that the essential 
weaknesses of the United Nations are a lack of centralised authority (the same applies to 
NATO) and the absence of a standing military force. With a view to the current strained 
financial times, countries with dual NATO and EU membership will most likely be unable to 
spend on two fronts, and will be required to pick either one structure to support, or to 
develop multi-faceted forces that are flexible enough to maintain readiness for eventuality; 
this latter course of action is far from straightforward. Politically, the development of any 
European forces would be subject to the views of the very nations that occasionally prevent 
solidarity within NATO.  
Ultimately therefore, through a combination of seemingly irresistible theoretical factors 
and international political reality, the Alliance retains a credible ability both to provide 
collective defence and project security in a number of guises. It does however face the 
challenge of ensuring it is appropriately poised to confront new threats as and when they 
arise. 
Regarding the centrality of consensus within NATO’s institutional framework, it would 
appear prima facie that the need to obtain agreement between twenty-eight countries with 
often divergent views is a requirement that would potentially disadvantage the Alliance when 
it needs to act quickly. However, the way that the concept has evolved so as to require mere 
acquiescence could arguably be said to impose a lower threshold than the process of 
qualified majority voting which would appear to be a logical alternative and one that is 
practiced in other similar institutions. There are however a number of caveats to this 
conclusion, namely that once a decision has been made for military action to be taken, the 
conduct of that action,  should not then be bogged down by the same level of bureaucracy as 
was seen in Kosovo. Secondly, an apparent weakness of the system is that it is vulnerable to 
the unreasonable objections of a member state that may arise from a number of eventualities. 
That being the case it would be beneficial to develop a system by which in those 
circumstances the objecting country, could be suspended from membership, thus denying 
them the opportunity to prevent otherwise legitimate action. There must however be an 
acceptance, that in seeking to retain both objectivity and legitimacy, there will from time to 
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time be an honestly held opposing view from within the member states; to create a system 
where such views were sidelined could in itself be seen, or at the very least portrayed, as 
undermining the essence of collective action and solidarity.  
The answer to the questions about the shape of future operations and unilateral action are 
inextricably linked. They both relate to the dissonance that lies at the heart of the Alliance 
and produce, one would suggest, a relatively straightforward answer. Firstly, whether or not 
it has fashioned itself in that way, and one suspects that the level of consistent consensus 
does not exist, NATO by virtue of its existing structures, ability to mount forces and dearth 
of a competing provider, has undoubtedly become the de facto force provider of first choice 
that the UN turns towards.  That being said, NATO has now developed a history of not 
maintaining a completely coherent approach when it goes to war, and therefore that should 
not perhaps be a legitimate expectation. Whilst there have been some imaginative attempts to 
reconcile these positions (Farrell and Rynning, 2010:691-692), which in itself shows a 
degree of institutional loyalty and determination, the current predicament cannot be so easily 
resolved. 
Although the burden-sharing debate is central to the problem, for once it is not simply all 
about the money. Whilst however there is such clear divergence between Alliance members 
as to the way global security issues should be resolved, there will be no serious inclination to 
resolve either the funding or wider contributory shortcomings within the Alliance. 
Accordingly, whilst history suggests that NATO will continue to do more than simply 
survive enjoying some successes and failures along the way, the inherent institutional 
tensions that exist will limit the potential it has to provide a permanent challenge to the UN. 
Overall, such a symbiosis may prove the best outcome for international security.  
Logically, these matters should form the basis of a comprehensive review. Should 
member states lose confidence in the Alliance’s ability to take coherent action, particularly in 
relation to Article 5, this will encourage the completion of bilateral and trilateral defence 
arrangements and may encourage renewed interest in the European Defence initiative, both 
of which would undermine the essential stability of the organisation. 
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